000			03348nam a2200265 4500
001			14191
003			GR-kaGGEEl
005			20231207125953.0
010			_a978-0-691-17673-4
090			_a14191
100			_a20231207d2018 m||y0engy5050 ba
101	0		_aeng
102			_aUK
105			_ay|||||||001yy
106			_ar
200	1		_aUnelected power _ethe quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state _fPaul Tucker
210			_aPrinceton _aOxford _cPrinceton University Press _dc2018
327			_aPreface -- 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values -- PART I. WELFARE: The Problem, and a Possible Solution -- 2. The Evolution of the Administrative State -- 3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State: Market Failure and Government Failure -- 4. The Structure of the Administrative State: A Hierarchy from Simple Agents to Trustees (and Guardians) -- 5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies: Credible Commitment to Settled Goals -- 6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies -- 7. Applying the Principles for Delegation -- PART II. VALUES: Democratic Legitimacy for Independent Agencies -- 8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1): Rule of Law and Constitutionalism -- 9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2): The Challenges to Delegation-with-Insulation Presented by Democracy -- 10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy Agencies versus Judges -- 11. The Political-Values-and-Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation -- 12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism: Central Bank Independence Driven by the Separation of Powers but Not a Fourth Branch -- PART III. INCENTIVES: The Administrative State in the Real World; Incentives and Values under Different Constitutional Structures -- 13. States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment -- 14. The Problem of Vague Objectives: A Nondelegation Doctrine for IAs -- 15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability: Legal Constraints versus Political Oversight -- 16. The Limits of Design: Power, Emergencies, and Self- Restraint -- PART IV. POWER: Overmighty Citizens? The Political Economy of Central Banking; Power, Legitimacy, and Reconstruction -- 17. Central Banking and The Politics of Monetary Policy -- 18. The Shift in Ideas: Credibility as a Surprising Door to Legitimacy -- 19. Tempting the Gods: Monetary Regime Orthodoxy before the Crisis -- 20. A Money-Credit Constitution: Central Banks and Banking Stability -- 21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State: Stability Policy -- 22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State: Balance-Sheet Policy and the Fiscal Carve-Out -- 23. Central Banks and the Emergency State: Lessons from Military/Civilian Relations for the Lender of Last Resort -- 24. Overmighty Citizens After All? Threats and Reconfigurations -- Conclusion: Unelected Democrats: Citizens in Service, Not in Charge -- Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics -- Acknowledgments -- Bibliography -- Index.
606		1	_aBanks and banking _xState supervision _925524
676			_a332.11
700		1	_aTucker _bPaul _4070 _925523
712	0	2	_aPrinceton University press _4650 _95859
942			_cBK